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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
George Allen Kapelle appeals from his convictions for manufacturing
marijuana and unlawful possession of a firearm.

Specifically, Kapelle challenges

the denial of his suppression motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The district court issued the following statement of facts:
On July 13, 2011, Detectives Mark Strangio and Marty Ryan
were searching for an individual named Steven Gervasi, who was
wanted on a felony arrest warrant. It was rumored that Gervasi
was hiding out with friends and possibly staying in an abandoned
trailer on Artisan Way, in Bonner County. The Detectives went to
Artisan Way and found a single wide trailer that appeared
abandoned. The Detectives did not observe a gate blocking the
entrance to the property, or any "No Trespassing" signs posted on
the property, even though the Defendant asserts that "No
trespassing" sign(s) were posted on the property and that a gate
exists.
The Detectives parked in the driveway and approached the
trailer on foot. Detective Strangio and Detective Ryan stayed on
the path of the driveway. As the Detectives neared the front porch
of the trailer, the Defendant stepped out of the front door. The
Detectives told the Defendant they were looking for Mr. Gervasi
and asked if they were at the right location. The Defendant said
that Mr. Gervasi was not there.
Detective Ryan asked the
Defendant if the officers could do a quick walk through of the
residence to look for Mr. Gervasi. According to the Detectives,
Kapelle said "okay," and then turned and walked back into his
residence, leaving the front door open. The Defendant denied
giving detectives consent to come inside and look for Mr. Gervasi;
he contends that he walked back into the trailer, and the Detectives
followed him.
Once inside the residence, the Detectives were
overwhelmed by the odor of fresh marijuana. The Detectives
noticed that the Defendant's composure appeared nervous.
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Detective Strangio asked if he could continue a walk-thru of the rest
of the property. The Defendant looked down the hallway, waited a
moment, and then replied, "I would rather you not walk back there."
At that time, Detective Ryan asked, "so how many plants do you
have brother, cause the odor is too much, it's killing us." The
Defendant then told the officers that he had only a few plants, but if
the officers would let him, he would just destroy the plants and
promise to never grow marijuana again.
Detective Ryan retrieved a digital recorder and a written
consent form from the Detectives' vehicle.
Upon returning,
Detective Ryan activated the recorder and created a recording of
the remainder of the Detectives' contact with the Defendant.
Detective Ryan Mirandized the Defendant, who then agreed to
speak to the officers. Detective Ryan provided the Defendant with
a consent form, explaining that he did not have to consent to a
search of his home, but if he did not then the Detectives would
acquire a search warrant. The Defendant asserts that he asked to
call an attorney at that time, but the Detective refused to allow the
contact. The Defendant then signed the consent form, and the
Detectives conducted a search that resulted in evidence of an
extensive marijuana grow operation.
During the search, the Detectives also asked the Defendant
if he had any weapons in the house, and the Defendant pointed out
a large caliber rifle that was sitting behind the front door. The
following day, it was discovered that the Defendant was convicted
of Felony Burglary in the State of California in 1997.
(R., pp.158-160.)

The state charged Kapelle with trafficking in marijuana and unlawful
possession of a firearm.

(R., pp.49-50.)

Kapelle filed a motion to suppress,

asserting his rights were violated by the officers' warrantless entry onto his
property as well as their warrantless entry into his home. (R., pp.60-61.) Kapelle
further asserted his right against self-incrimination was violated when he made
statements to the detectives and evidence was seized "after his request to
contact an attorney [was] communicated to law enforcement while inside his
home." (R., p.62.)
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Following a two-part hearing on the motion where the state presented the
testimony of Detectives Ryan and Strangio and Kapelle testified on his own
behalf as well as calling his mother and two neighbors to the stand (see
generally, Tr., pp. 7-192), the court issued a written memorandum opinion and
order denying Kapelle's motion to suppress (R., pp.158-173).
Kapelle entered a conditional plea of guilty to an amended charge of
manufacturing marijuana and unlawful possession of a firearm, reserving his right
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.195, L.14 - p.196, L.12,
p.204, L.7 - p.205, L.2.) The court placed Kapelle on a three-year period of
supervised probation with concurrent underlying five-year unified sentences with
the first two years fixed. (Tr., p.218, Ls.2-9; R., pp.189-196.) Following an order
reinstating Kapelle's appeal upon his motion, Kapelle filed a timely amended
notice of appeal. (2/27 /13 Order; 3/11/13 Amended NOA)
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ISSUE
Kapelle's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as
required by I.AR. 35(a)(4). The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Kapelle failed to show that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Kapelle Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Suppression Motion

A

Introduction
The district court concluded law enforcement lawfully entered the curtilage

surrounding Kapelle's home and received valid consent from Kapelle to search
his home. (R., pp.160-168.)
Kapelle argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress because there was no "legitimate societal purpose" for law
enforcement to enter Kapelle's property nor did they obtain valid consent from
Kapelle to enter or search his home.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-12.)

Kapelle's

arguments are without merit. As such, Kapelle has failed to establish the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 4856, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309
(2004).

Whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact, the

determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds,
146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145
Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). At a suppression hearing,
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the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

State v.

Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v.
Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). "Findings will
not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in
the record."

Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v.

Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481,485 (Ct. App. 2006)).

C.

Kapelle Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Finding That
Law Enforcement Was Legally Justified In Entering His Property
Kapelle argues on appeal that the "tip" Detective Ryan received from an

"individual [who] had given [him] information in the past that had led to the
apprehension of a felon suspect in recent history" (Tr., P.12, Ls.5-8) that Gervasi
could be found in "an abandoned trailer on Artisan Way" (Tr., p.17, Ls.9-10) was
not reliable and Kapelle was deprived of testing its reliability in court.
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.)

Although the district court did not address the

reliability of the information provided to the detectives in denying Kapelle's
motion to suppress, it had previously denied Kapelle's motion to compel
information about the informant as being without merit. (R., pp.96-100.)
Armed with the information provided by Detective Ryan's source, which
provided the detectives with reasonable suspicion to believe they would locate
Gervasi in the location described, the detectives came upon Kapelle's property
and, noting the dilapidated appearance of the trailer and taking into consideration
their belief the trailer was located in the area described by Detective Ryan's
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source, they entered the property and eventually made contact with Kapelle.
(Tr., p.15, L.3 - p.24, L.19.) As it turned out, the location they ended up at in the
rural area of Artisan Way was not in fact the location described by Ryan's source,
although the detectives did not realize this at the time.
L.14.)

(Tr., p.15, L.9 - p.17,

The district court correctly determined, in denying Kapelle's motion to

compel, that it was "undisputed that officers made a mistake in believing that
Defendant's trailer was abandoned" and "[w]hether or not the officers acted
reasonably when approaching Defendant's trailer (that is, whether or not, for
example, the trailer looked abandoned) [was] a question for the officers, and not
the informant." (R., p.98.)
Kapelle argues law enforcement is not allowed to approach an individual's
home by means of a driveway without a warrant because "it is within the home's
curtilage." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Such claim is without merit. Idaho precedent
is clear that it is constitutionally permissible to enter onto the curtilage of one's
property. As explained in State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 313, 859 P.2d 344, 349
(Ct. App 1993) (citations omitted):
There is an implied invitation for the public to use access routes to
the house, such as parking areas, driveways, sidewalks, or
pathways to the entry, and there can be no reasonable expectation
of privacy as to observations which can be made from such areas.
Like other citizens, police with legitimate business are entitled to
enter areas of the cartilage that are impliedly open to public use.
See State v. Prewitt, 136 Idaho 547, 551, 38 P.3d 126, 130 (Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that objects viewed while officer approached home using driveway did
not constitute unlawful search).
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Kapelle further argues that it was clear from the set-up of Kapelle and his
neighbors' properties, including "no trespassing" signs, that "uninvited visitors
[were] neither encouraged nor expected" and this required law enforcement
obtain a warrant prior to accessing his property through the driveway.
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.)

Kapelle concedes "signs alone do not create a

legitimate expectation of privacy," but maintains that "no trespassing" signs
combined with "a primitive road and secluded location" would give "a respective
citizen" the belief that he did not have consent to enter. (Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The detectives, however, both testified they did not see a "no trespassing" sign
on the date in question. (See, Tr., p.18, L.19- p.19, L.3, p.72, L.16 - p.73, L.3,
p.86, Ls.15-19, p.105, L.18 - p.106, L.11.) As Detective Ryan testified, there
was nothing that led him to believe someone "would be disallowed from walking
up and knocking on the door and making contact." (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-3.)
Ultimately, the district court found the testimony of the officers more
credible than that of Kapelle and his neighbors on the issue of whether there
were indicia of measures taken to prevent access to Kapelle's home on the date
in question. The district court was in the best position to determine the credibility
of these witnesses and its determination is supported by the record in this matter.
The court further found that even had there been a sign posted,
the Detectives stayed on the driveway and path to the front door of
the trailer, did not search the area between the entry and the
Defendant's trailer for any violations of the law, and provided
sufficient proof that they were there for a legitimate societal
purpose: inquiring into the location of a wanted felon. Therefore,
even if there was a "no trespassing" sign posted, the entry in to the
curtilage is lawful.
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(R., pp.165-166.)
Kapelle has failed to establish otherwise and has therefore failed to show
any error in the district court's contrary conclusion on this point.

D.

Kapelle Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Finding
Kapelle's Consent To Search Was Valid
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal

and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693,
695,978 P.2d 881,883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516,
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)).
Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,
852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001).

The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a

question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.

kl

at 848, 852, 26 P.3d at 35; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.

218, 225-226 (1973)).

In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of

duress or coercion, either direct or implied.

Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 228.

A

voluntary decision is one that is "the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker."

kl

at 225.

An individual's consent is

involuntary, on the other hand, "if his will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired." State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137
P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 225). The mere
presence of officers asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of
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law, to constitute improper police duress or coercion.

See United States v.

Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
As the Idaho Court of Appeals explained in State v. Rector, 144 Idaho
643, 646, 167 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2006), a trial court's factual determination
regarding consent is entitled to deference:
The trial court is the proper forum for the "careful sifting of
the unique facts and circumstances of each case" necessary in
determining voluntariness. Even though the evidence may be
equivocal and somewhat in dispute, if the trial court's finding of fact
is based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
record, it will not be disturbed on appeal. In short, whether a
consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, and our
standard of review requires that we accept a trial court's factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings will not be
deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.
(Citations omitted.)
Applying these principles to the evidence before it, the district court
correctly concluded that Kapelle voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into
his house and to their search of the trailer. (R., pp.166-168.)
Upon making contact with Kapelle standing on the porch of the previously
believed to be abandoned trailer, Detective Ryan asked Kapelle if Gervasi was in
the trailer. (Tr., p.24, L.8 - p.26, L.11.) The detective asked to come inside to
make sure Gervasi was not hiding in there and Kapelle "stared at [them] for a
second, said okay and turned and just walked into the house leaving the door
open."

(Tr., p.26, Ls.16-18.)

Detective Strangio was unable to remember if

Kapelle gave an audible answer in the affirmative to Detective Ryan's question to
enter Kapelle's trailer, but testified Kapelle at least "shook his head in the
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affirmative" and the detectives entered only "after he gave us the okay to do so."
(Tr., p.103, L.22.) Although Kapelle argues on appeal that consent was not given
to enter the home as "it is unlikely that Kapelle would consent to officers entering
his home when it contained an overwhelming odor of marijuana and 39
marijuana plants" (Appellant's brief, p.9), the court specifically found that the
officers' version of events was more credible, and that there was nothing to
indicate that this consent was coerced. (R., p.167.) There were only two officers
present at Kapelle's residence and they were dressed in plain clothes. (Tr., p.18,
Ls.16-18.) Although the officers had their weapons drawn in anticipation of being
confronted by a wanted felon, their guns remained at their sides and were not
pointed at Kapelle. (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-17.)
Although Kapelle asserts on appeal that, if he did consent to entry into his
trailer, it was not voluntary, all he points to as evidence of coercion is Kapelle's
own demeanor as "wide eyed, scared, nervous and confused" in addition to the
"officer's nervous and excited demeanor."
omitted).)

(Appellant's brief, p.9 (citation

The allegations of a nervous and excited demeanor by the officers

present is not supported by the record (see, Tr., p.94, Ls.3-4 (testimony by
Detective Strangio that neither officer yelled at Kapelle at any point)) nor does
Kapelle's anxiety render his consent involuntary.
Once inside the trailer pursuant to Kapelle's voluntary consent, the officers
immediately smelled the odor of growing marijuana. (Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.13,
35, Ls.2-17,

p.94, L.13 - p.95, L.19.) Thereafter Kapelle signed a consent to

search form allowing the officers access to the trailer.
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(R., p.130.)

Kapelle

claims on appeal his signing of the consent form was coerced in that the officers
"made it clear to Kapelle that if he did not consent to a full search, they would
'lock down' the premises and that Kapelle would be arrested." (Appellant's brief,
p.11.)

Not only did the detectives not threaten to arrest Kapelle, they never

placed him in handcuffs (Tr., p.37, Ls.21-23) and Detective Ryan advised Kapelle
that "when this [was] all done," they would just issue Kapelle a summons for any
charge (Tr., p.40, Ls.3-4).
Kapelle contends he only consented to a search because of a threat by
the officers to get a search warrant.

(Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.)

However,

where, as here, officers have probable cause to obtain a search warrant, it is not
coercive to make such a statement to the homeowner. As the district court
correctly held, "the fact that the Detectives would obtain a warrant if the
Defendant refused the consent to search does not in and of itself render the
Defendant's consent involuntary." (R., p.168.) See State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho
840, 848, 186 P.3d 696, 740 (Ct. App. 2008) ("consent to search not rendered
involuntary by the officer's truthful explanation that he could obtain a warrant."
(citation omitted).)
Ultimately, the district court found the testimony of the officers more
credible than that of Kapelle.

The district court was in the best position to

determine the credibility of these witnesses and since its determination is
supported by the record in this matter, it should stand. The district court correctly
concluded Kapelle "consented to the entry and the search of his residence, and
that the consent was voluntary based on the evidence presented." (R., p.168.)
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Kapelle has failed to show that the district court's determination that
Kapelle consented to the entry of law enforcement into his home and the search
of his home was clearly erroneous and therefore has failed

to establish the

district court erred in denying Kapelle's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Kapelle's motion to suppress.

Dated this 26th day of November 201 .
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